Criminal Procedure - United States v. De Gross: The Ninth Circuit Expands Restrictions on a Criminal Defendant\u27s Right to Exercise Peremptory Challenges by Ferraro, Eric K.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey Article 12
January 1993
Criminal Procedure - United States v. De Gross:
The Ninth Circuit Expands Restrictions on a
Criminal Defendant's Right to Exercise Peremptory
Challenges
Eric K. Ferraro
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric K. Ferraro, Criminal Procedure - United States v. De Gross: The Ninth Circuit Expands Restrictions on a Criminal Defendant's Right to
Exercise Peremptory Challenges, 23 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1993).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/12
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
UNITED STATES v. DE GROSS: THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT EXPANDS RESTRICTIONS ON A 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO 
EXERCISE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. De Gross,I the Ninth Circuit held that a 
criminal defendant's exercise of a peremptory challenge2 based 
solely on the gender of the venire person violates the potential 
juror's rights to equal protection under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.3 
The Ninth Circuit's decisipn represents a step forward in 
restraining purposeful discrimination in the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges. In De Gross, the court expanded upon the rea-
soning of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Batson 
v. Kentucky:' The court recognized that the Fifth Amendment's 
1. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (per Wallace, C.J.; the 
other panel members were Hug, J., Tang, J., Schroeder, J., Alarcon, J., Nelson, J., Rein-
hardt, J., Beezer, J., Wiggins, J., Rymer, J., and Fernandez, J.). 
2. A peremptory challenge is the method whereby a litigant can exercise his or her 
right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the 
challenge. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24. 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides in part: "No person shall ... be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law .... " 
The fifth amendment does not contain the "explicit safeguard" of an equal protec-
tion clause, as does the fourteenth amendment. Nevertheless, equal protection principles 
have been consistently derived from the fifth amendment's due process clause. Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text discussing the 
Batson decision holding that the Constitution forbids peremptory challenges based 
solely on the race of the venire person and setting forth a new evidentiary standard that a 
109, 
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equal protection principles regulate only state action and not 
private conduct. 6 Reasoning that a criminal defendants becomes 
a state actors6 by invoking the authority of the state when exer-
cising governmental peremptory challenges,7 the court concluded 
that the Fifth Amendment prohibits a criminal defendant's ex-
ercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges.8 
The Ninth Circuit further held that the government has 
standing9 to object to a discriminatory peremptory challenge, 
based on its own injuryl0 as well as the injury to the potential 
juror.ll The Ninth Circuit also held that equal protection princi-
ples effectively prohibit discriminatory peremptory challenges 
based solely on the gender of the venireperson.12 
II. FACTS 
Juana Espericueta De Gross was convicted of aiding and 
abetting the transportation of an alien within the United 
States. IS During voir dire,14 De Gross' exercised her first seven 
criminal defendant must meet in order to establish a prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination against the prosecution's peremptory challenge. 
5. "In determining whether an action complained of constitutes 'state action' within 
purview of [Fifth) Amendment, the court must examine whether a sufficiently close 
nexus exists between state and challenged action so that the action may fairly be treated 
as that of the state itself." Denver Welfare Rights Org. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 547 P.2d 
239, 243 (Colo. 1976). 
6. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of criminal 
defendants as state actors. 
7. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1440-42. 
8. Id. at 1440. 
9. Id. at 1436-37. 
10. Id. at 1436. The government has a legitimate interest in having its criminal pros-
ecutions tried before a jury most likely to produce a fair result. Singer v. United States, 
380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). Hence, it follows that the government is injured when the defend-
ant endeavors to secure a partisan jury through discriminatory peremptory strikes. See 
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (8 defendant is denied due process by circum-
stances that create the likelihood or the appearance of bias). 
11. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1436. Generally, a party must assert his or her own legal 
rights as another has no standing to raise those interests for the aggrieved. Powers v. 
Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991). However, a third party may promote the rights of 
another if the third party's ability to protect his or her own interest will be hindered 
otherwise. Id. at 1371-72. 
12. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1438. In reaching this conclusion, the De Gross court drew 
from recent United States Supreme Court decisions holding that the Constitution for-
bids discriminatory peremptory challenges based solely on the race of the potential juror. 
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
13. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1992). 8 U.S.C. § 1324 
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peremptory challenges to strike male venirepersons.16 When De 
Gross attempted to exercise her eighth peremptory challenge to 
strike Wendell Tiffany, yet another male venireperson, the gov-
ernment objected, contending that De Gross' pattern of striking 
males established her discriminatory intent. IS The government 
argued that such discriminatory challenges violate the male 
venireperson's constitutional rights to equal protection of the 
laws.17 
The district court held that the government established a 
prima facie case of intentional discrimination, and required that 
De Gross furnish a non-discriminatory justification for the chal-
lenge.18 When De Gross offered no explanation for the challenge, 
the court disallowed her peremptory challenge and empaneled 
Tiffany.19 
After De Gross' challenge of Tiffany, the government pe-
remptorily challenged Herminia Tellez, the only Hispanic on the 
venire.20 In turn, De Gross objected to this peremptory challenge 
made by the prosecution, claiming the challenge violated Tel-
lez's constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment.21 The 
district court likewise required the government to justify its 
challenge because De Gross had established a prima facie case of 
discrimination.22 Government counsel explained that the pur-
pose of its peremptory challenge was to attempt to achieve "a 
more representative community of men and women on the 
jury."23 The district court accepted the government's grounds 
(1983), prohibits a United States citizen from facilitating the transportation of an alien 
within the United States. 
14. "Voir dire" is the designated phrase for the preliminary examination the court 
and attorneys make of prospective jurors to determine their competence and qualifica-
tions to serve as jurors. Peremptory challenges or challenges for cause may result from 
such examination. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990). 
15. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1435-36. "Venireperson" is the term designating potential 
jurors in the jury pool, or the "venire." . . 
16. [d. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text for discussion of discrimina-
tory intent. 
17. [d. at 1436. 
18. [d. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text setting forth the elements of 
the prima facie case of intentional discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. At that point, ten women and two men had been empaneled on the jury, and 
3
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for the challenge as non-discriminatory and excused Tellez.24 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE SYSTEM 
The Constitution does not guarantee the right to peremp-
tory challenges.211 However, state and federal statutes provide for 
peremptory challenges in the majority of jurisdictions,26 and 
courts have long recognized the peremptory challenge as an inte-
gral part of the jury selection procedure.27 The United States 
Supreme Court has stressed the vital role of peremptory chal-
lenges in the trial by jury process, stating that the challenge is 
"one of the most important of the rights secured to the ac-
cused. "28 The purpose of the peremptory challenge is "not only 
to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure 
the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will 
decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not 
otherwise. "29 
the remainder of the venire consisted of six women and one man. Id. n.3. 
24.Id. 
25. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (citing Stilson v. United States, 250 
U.S. 583, 586 (1919». 
26. In the federal system, each litigant is entitled to 20 peremptories in capital 
cases. In a felony trial the defendant may exercise 10 peremptory challenges and the 
prosecution is entitled to 6, while in a misdemeanor case each litigant is entitled to three 
peremptory challenges. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). In the majority of state jurisdictions, simi-
lar. provisions are found with the prosecution and defense having the sarne number of 
peremptory challenges. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 
22(d) (2nd ed. 1992). 
27. See Paul H. Schwartz, Note, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Imple-
mentation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1533 (1991) (pro-
viding a detailed account of the history of the peremptory challenge); see generally 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-21 (1965); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 
(1892) (discussing the history of the peremptory challenge in civil voir dire proceedings). 
28. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting Pointer v. United States, 
151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894». 
29. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. Certain commentators have suggested that a fundamen-
tal basis for the existence of the peremptory challenge is that it is "a means of satisfying 
litigants that their case is being determined by an impartial group of laypeople." Com-
ment, The Right of Peremptory Challenge, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762 (1957). 
The peremptory challenge serves important functions. It exemplifies the notion that 
a jury is the proper mode for deciding matters because the litigants choose the jurors, 
thus guarding against faction. Additionally, it serves "as a shield for the exercise of the 
challenge for cause," because during voir dire questioning, the lawyer may have so alien-
ated the venireperson that it becomes necessary to strike him, although pursuant to the 
challenge for cause the lawyer has not established any basis for removal. Barbara Allen 
Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 552-55 
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Historically, litigants could exercise the peremptory chal-
lenge without justification. This is unlike the challenge for 
cause30 which requires that the party seeking elimination satisfy 
an objective disqualification standard.31 Because the trial court 
must, by definition, scrutinize a litigant's grounds and motives 
for the exercise of a challenge for cause, there is little risk that 
the challenge will be allowed if exercised for improper reasons 
such as race or gender discrimination. There are, however, no 
such inherent safeguards against the misuse of the peremptory 
challenge.32 Therefore, courts have imposed limits on the use of 
the peremptory challenge so that the constitutional rights of all 
parties can be protected.33 
B. CASES CHALLENGING THE EXERCISE OF RACIALLy-BASED 
DISCRIMINATORY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AS VIOLATIVE OF 
EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES 
As early as 1879, the United States Supreme Court held 
that prohibiting blacks from serving on juries was a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause.34 However, it was not until 1965, in 
(1975). 
30. The challenge for cause is a request from a litigant to the court that a certain 
prospective juror not be allowed to be a member of the jury because of specified causes 
or reasons. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988). 
31. Failure to meet the statutory qualifications for jury duty, evidence of bias, and 
relationship to one of the litigants are grounds for challenging a potential juror for cause. 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3(c) (2nd ed. 1992). 
Additionally, if the prospective juror is found to have a state of mind that will prevent 
her from acting with impartiality, this constitutes actual bias, requiring the challenge for 
cause be granted. [d. 
This is not to suggest that any isolated statement by a venire person necessitates 
granting the challenge. In Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032-33 (1984), the Court held 
that the determination is essentially one of credibility, and therefore of demeanor. The 
trial judge has discretion to believe or dismiss those statements, depending on the sur-
rounding circumstances, such as leading questions. 
32. See Joseph F. Lawless, Jr., Prosecutorial Misconduct 409 (1985), claiming that 
"the exercise of a peremptory challenge is virtually uncontrolled and completely discre-
tionary by both parties. These challenges may be abused by those ... who would seek to 
exercise them to obtain conviction-prone or racially unbalanced juries .... " 
33. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892). 
The peremptory challenge has been the subject of much criticism, and there are 
those who advocate eliminating the whole peremptory challenge system. See Jonathan B. 
Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial Discrimi-
nation and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection), 
72 CORNELL L. REV. 1026 (1987). 
34. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). In Strauder, the United States 
Supreme Court determined that the fourteenth amendment, ratified eleven years earlier, 
5
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Swain v. Alabama,3G that the Court addressed the question of 
whether the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges to 
exclude minoriti~s from juries violated equal protection 
principles.36 . 
In Swain, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged 
that discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge could vio-
late a venireperson's equal protection rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution.37 There, Robert Swain, 
a black man, was convicted of rape and sentenced to death.3s 
Swain sought to strike the trial jury which convicted him, alleg-
ing the prosecution had intentionally discriminated against him 
on the basis of race by peremptorily striking all black venireper-
sons at his trial. 39 The Court rejected Swain's argument, holding 
that the prosecutor's peremptory challenges were not subject to 
scrutiny on constitutional grounds!O The Court presumed that 
the state's challenges were intended only to obtain a fair and 
impartial jury,41 explaining that any other presumption would 
"establish a rule wholly at odds with the peremptory challenge 
system as we know it. "42 
The Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment 
claim takes on added significance whenever members of a racial 
group are systematically excluded from jury service.43 However, 
was adopted to "assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that 
under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the 
general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the states." [d. 
at 306. Thus, the Court held that the state statute prohibiting blacks from serving on 
juries was violative of the fourteenth amendment. [d. at 308. 
35. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
36. [d. at 204. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. at 203. 
39. [d. at 203-05. 
40. [d. at 222. 
41. [d. The Court announced that it was permissible to insulate from inquiry the 
peremptory strikes of black venirepersons on the "assumption that the prosecutor is act-
ing on acceptable considerations related to the case he is trying, the particular defendant 
involved, and the particular crime charged." [d. at 223. 
42. [d. at 222. 
43. [d. at 223. The United States Supreme Court declared that in circumstances 
where the prosecutor was regularly removing qualified black jurors with peremptory 
challenges, "giving even the widest leeway to the operation of irrational but trial-related 
suspicions and antagonisms, it would appear that the purpose of the peremptory chal-
lenge [is) being perverted. If the state has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury 
in a criminal case, the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome." [d. 
6
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in order to rebut the presumption and establish a prima facie 
case against the prosecution, the defendant was required to 
demonstrate a systematic pattern of purposeful discriminatory 
peremptory strikes.44 The defendant would be compelled to 
demonstrate that this methodical exclusion had deprived black 
persons of the right to serve, not only at his own trial, but on 
juries in all cases.45 Although Swain contended that the state 
had systematically and consistently excluded blacks from juries 
in previous cases,46 the Court found that Swain had not over-
come the imposing evidentiary standard}7 
Swain was the first United States Supreme Court decision 
to restrict the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges. Nev-
ertheless, its impact on trial procedures was limited because few 
defendants were able to overcome the presumption of fairness as 
announced by the Court.'8 Not until the 1986 decision of Batson 
v. Kentucky 49 did the United States Supreme Court relax the 
evidentiary standard necessary for a criminal defendant to es-
tablish a prima facie case of discrimination against the prosecu-
tion's peremptory challenges. 
In that case, Batson, a black man, was indicted and con-
victed on charges of burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 50 The 
prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges to strike the 
only four black venirepersons from the jury pool, and selected a 
at 223-24. 
44. [d. at 224. 
45. [d. 
46. [d. at 223. Petitioner's argument was not only that all black venirepersons were 
peremptorily stricken from his jury, but that "there hard] never been a Negro on a petit 
jury in either a civil or criminal case in Talladega County .... " [d. at 222-23. 
47. [d. at 224. The Court acknowledged that "there [had] not been a Negro on a 
jury in Talladega County since about 1950." [d. at 226. However, Swain was unable to 
sustain his burden of proving that the absence of black jurors in Talladega County was 
due entirely to discriminatory peremptory strikes exercised by the prosecution. 
48. Among those courts that employed the Swain standard to analyze the potential 
misuse of the peremptory challenge, it appears that defendants were seldom able to over-
come the overwhelming burden of proof required to effectively contest the exclusion of 
venirepersons. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 (Marshall, J., concurring). An exam-
ple where the Swain standard was satisfied is State v. Washington, 375 S.2d 1162 (La. 
1979), where a black defendant was convicted by a jury in which all but one black 
venireperson was peremptorily stricken. The court sustained the defendant's claim of 
discrimination because the prosecutor conceded that he considered blacks, as a group, 
too unintelligent to sit on the jury. [d. at 1164. 
49. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
50. [d. at 82. 
7
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jury composed exclusively of white persons. III Counsel for the de-
fendant moved to discharge the jury, asserting that the prosecu-
tor's removal of black venirepersons violated the defendant's 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to equal protection of 
the laws.1I2 On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court refused to 
uphold Batson's objection since he failed to establish a consis-
tent pattern of intentional discrimination by the prosecution, as 
was then required under Swain v. Alabama. lls 
The United States Supreme Court held that proof of the 
prosecution's pattern of intentional discrimination, demon-
strated by repeatedly striking blacks from jury venires, was un-
necessary to establish a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.1I4 The Court noted that this interpretation of Swain 
placed a'staggering burden of proof on criminal defendants/III re-
sulting in prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges in ways 
that were "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny."lIs 
The Batson Court announced a new standard of evidentiary 
proof necessary for defendants to meet when alleging purposeful 
. discrimination by the prosecution in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges. Batson allowed a criminal defendant to establish a 
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination based "solely on 
evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory 
challenges at [that particular] defendant's trial."117 The Court 
held that all relevant circumstances would be considered in de-
termining whether the defendant has made the requisite show-
ing of discrimination. liS For instance, the prosecutor's questions 
51. ld. 
52. ld. Defense counsel also objected to the prosecution's removal of black 
venirepersons on the ground that defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury drawn 
from a cross-section of the community was being violated. The judge, reasoning that the 
cross-section requirement only applied to selection of the venire, and not to the jury 
itself, denied defendant's motion, stating that the parties were entitled to use their chal-
lenges to "strike anybody they want to." 
53. ld. at 83. 
54. ld. at 92. 
55.ld. 
56. ld. at 92-93. 
57. ld. at 96. In order to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, 
the defendant must prove that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, that the 
prosecution has peremptorily stricken members of the defendant's race from the venire, 
and that the encompassing facts and circumstances suggest that the prosecution ex-
cluded the venirepersons on account of their race. ; 
58.ld. 
8
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and statements to black venirepersons, and the accompanying 
peremptory challenges might suggest purposeful dis-
crimination.1I9 
Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the bur-
den shifts to the state to justify its challenge of minority 
venirepersons with a racially neutral reason for seeking to re-
move the juror.60 However, the prosecution may not offer as ex-
planation its assumption that the challenged venireperson would 
be biased due to a shared ethnicity or race with the defendant.61 
Additionally, the Batson Court held the Equal Protection 
Clause62 forbids exclusion of minority jurors on the assumption 
that the minority members, as a group, are unfit to serve as 
jurors.6S 
C. QUESTIONS UNANSWERED 
In Batson v. Kentucky 64 and Swain v. Alabama,611 the 
United States Supreme Court limited the prosecution's use of 
59. [d. at 97. The Court explained that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir 
dire procedures, would be best able to discern if a prima facie case of discrimination had 
been established. 
60. [d. The Court emphasized that while the requirement of a justification for a 
challenge diminishes its historic peremptory character, the prosecution's explanation 
need not rise to the level demanded for a challenge for cause. See supra notes 30-31 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the challenge for cause. 
6!. [d. 
62. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), involved a state defendant and there-
fore the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is applicable. United 
States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992), involved a federal defendant, thus the 
equal protection principles of the fifth amendment apply. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits any state 
from taking action which would "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954). The Constitution 
contains no textual authority for prohibiting the federal government from denying indi-
. viduals equal protection. However, it has been held that the due process clause of the 
fifth amendment imposes comparable restrictions on the actions of the national govern-
ment. [d. at 499. 
63. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The United States Supreme Court in Batson purposely 
limited its holding to discriminatory peremptory challenges on the basis of race. How-
ever, Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, suggested that the Court's decision would open 
the floodgates for objections to peremptory challenges "on the basis of not only race, but 
also sex, age, religious or political affiliation, mental capacity, number of children, living 
arrangements, and employment in a particular industry or profession." [d. at 124 (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting). 
64. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
65. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
9
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discriminatory peremptory challenges. However, the Court had 
not yet expressed an opinion on whether equal protection princi-
ples similarly limit a criminal defendant's exercise of peremp-· 
tory challenges.66 Furthermore, the Court had not explored the 
issue of whether the Constitution prohibits discriminatory pe-
remptory strikes on the basis of gender. 
In United States v. De Gross,67 the Ninth Circuit addressed 
both of these issues, further extending the constitutional con-
straints on the exercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges. 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In United States v. De Gross,68 the Ninth Circuit reversed 
De Gross' conviction of aiding and abetting the transportation of 
an alien within the United States due to the prosecution's use of 
a discriminatory peremptory challenge. The court held that the 
Fifth Amendment's equal protection principles prohibit a crimi-
nal defendant's peremptory challenge based on the gender of the 
venire person. 69 
66. The Batson majority purposely declined to express its views on whether the 
Constitution limits defendant's peremptory challenges. 476 U.S. at 89 n.12. However, 
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, stated that since prosecutors are limited in their 
challenges, it is irrational to hold that defendants are not. [d. at 126 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). Burger further stated that "every jurisdiction which has spoken to the matter, 
and prohibited prosecution case-specific peremptory challenges on the basis of cogniza-
ble group affiliation, has held that the defense must likewise be so prohibited." [d. at 89 
n.6 (quoting United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 565 (5th Cir. 1986». 
At the time the De Gross opinion was written, no United States Supreme Court case 
had confronted the issue of equal protection restraints on criminal defendants' peremp-
tory challenges. However, the Court's recent decision in Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 
2348 (1992), does address this issue, and holds that a criminal defendant is limited by 
the Constitution. McCollum was decided after De Gross, and is thus not discussed in the 
background section of this article. See infra notes 139-49 for a discussion of McCollum 
and its applicability to the instant case. 
67. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992). 
68. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1443 (9th Cir. 1992). 
69. [d. at 1438. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1988) et seq., provides that a litigant is entitled to 
a trial by jury in which the jury selection process is free from discrimination or bias. "A 
defendant may establish a prima facie case of improper ... jury selection under the 
constitutional standard by establishing absolute exclusion or systematic under-
representation of a cognizable, distinct class." United States v. Gruberg, 493 F. Supp. 
234, 245 (S.D. N.Y. 1979). 
The major problem raised by defendant's assertion that the jury selection process 
has been tainted by discrimination lies in defining "cognizable" groups. United States v. 
Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), set forth the standard for determining 
whether a group is cognizable. The defendant must show that the group is defined and 
10
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The Ninth Circuit confronted three issues raised in De 
Gross: first, whether the government had standing to object to 
the defendant's peremptory challenge; second, whether equal 
protection principles forbid gender-based discrimination in a 
criminal defendant's peremptory challenge; and third, if equal 
protection principles do prohibit such challenges, whether De 
Gross exercised her peremptory challenge with discriminatory 
intent.7o 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the Fifth Amendment's equal protection principles 
forbid a party from peremptorily striking venirepersons on the 
basis of gender is a question of law that the Ninth Circuit re-
viewed de novo. 71 
B. THE GOVERNMENT'S STANDING TO OBJECT TO DE GROSS' 
CHALLENGE 
The Ninth Circuit rejected De Gross' argument that the 
government lacked the requisite standing to object to her pe-
remptory challenge.72 The government maintained that it had 
standing based on its own injury, as well as the injury to the 
challenged juror.78 The court announced that "racial discrimina-
tion in the jury selection process casts doubt on the integrity of 
the judicial process and the fairness of the criminal proceed-
ing."," Therefore, when a criminal defe~dant endeavors to se-_ 
limited by some factor, that a common thread or basic similarity in attitudes or ideas or 
experience runs through the group, and that there is a community of interest among 
members such that the group's interests cannot be adequately represented if the group is 
excluded from the jury selection process. [d. at 143-44. 
70. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1436. 
71. [d. See also United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984). 
72. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1436. 
73. [d. For further discussion, see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
74. [d. at 1437 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1371 (1991)). The court also 
noted that discriminatory practices in jury selection create the appearance of prejudice 
in the decision of individual cases, while increasing the danger of actual bias as well. De 
Gross, 960 F.2d at 1436 (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1972)). Additionally, 
the court explained that excluding cognizable groups from jury service effectively re-
stricts community participation in the administration of the criminal justice system; 
"participation which is critical to public confidence in the fairness" of that system. Id. 
(citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)). 
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cure a partisan jury through the exercise of discriminatory pe-
remptory challenges, the government suffers injury as a result of 
the perceived and actual deterioration of the criminal justice 
system. 
The Ninth Circuit further held that the government has 
standing to object to the defendant's discriminatory peremptory 
challenge by asserting the excluded venireperson's equal protec-
tion rights.711 A venireperson who has been excluded by a dis-
criminatory peremptory challenge may face several obstacles to 
asserting his or her own constitutional rights.78 Unless the po-
tential juror is aware of the challenging party's pattern of pe-
remptorily striking members of a cognizable group, the 
venireperson may not realize that he or she is the victim of dis-
crimination.77 Additionally, it is unlikely the excluded venireper-
son will bring a constitutional challenge on his or her own behalf 
due to the prohibitive cost of litigation and the small financial 
stakes.78 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded the government has 
standing to object to the peremptory challenge exercised by De 
Gross. 
C. GENDER-BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
The Ninth Circuit expanded on the Supreme Court's rulings 
in Batson v. Kentucky 79 and Swain v. Alabama80 by stating that 
equal protection principles prohibit not only racially-based dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges,81 but gender-based chal-
lenges as well.82 Although the Constitution will tolerate gender-
based discrimination when an important governmental objective 
IS being served,83 the peremptory challenge cannot be based 
75. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1437. See supra note 11 for discussion of situations in 
which the rights of a party may be raised by another. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. 
79. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
80. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
81. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. 
82. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1437-38. 
83. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender-based classifications 
must be substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives 
to withstand constitutional scrutiny); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (administrative 
ease and convenience are not sufficiently important objectives to sustain use of an overt 
gender criterion in the appointment of administrators of intestate decedents' estates). 
12
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solely on the gender of the potential juror.M 
The Batson Court held that striking a potential juror on the 
basis of his or her race harms the excluded venireperson, under-
mines public confidence in the judicial system, and stimulates 
community prejudice.86 Deciding that these symptoms are just 
as likely to occur as a result of gender-based discrimination, the 
Ninth Circuit held that equal protection principles prohibit gen-
der-based discriminatory peremptory challenges.86 
. 84. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1439. 
85. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. The Batson Court announced that "[p)urposeful racial 
discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection 
because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure." [d. at 86. 
See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879), stating that the purpose of 
the jury is to be composed of the peers or equals of the accused so as to afford him a 
tribunal free of the prejudices that often exist against certain classes in the community. 
A jury of peers operates to preserve the defendant's enjoyment of the full protection of 
the laws. 
86. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1438. This conclusion is not unanimously supported by all 
the circuit courts of appeals. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 
1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988), held that the government could offer as a neutral justification 
for its peremptory challenge a gender-based explanation. The Hamilton court stated that 
while it did not applaud the striking of jurors for any reason relating to group classifica-
tion, there was no authority to support an extension of Batson's equal protection princi-
ples to situations other than racial discrimination. [d. at 1042. 
Compare Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975), where the United States 
Supreme Court held that the systematic exclusion of women from jury venires violated 
the potential juror's rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In that case, the Court found a Louisiana jury selection procedure to be unconsti-
tutional because a woman could not be selected for jury service unless she had previously 
filed an application requesting consideration for jury service. [d. at 523. The net effect 
of this system was that disproportionately few women, as compared with the number 
available in the community, were ever called for jury service. [d. at 525. This case is 
distinguishable from Hamilton because in Hamilton there had been no claim that 
women were systematically excluded from jury service. Hamilton, 850 F.2d at 1042. 
For a thoughtful examination of gender-based peremptory challenges, see S. Alexan-
dria Joe, Reconstruction of the Peremptory Challenge System: A Look at Gender-Based 
Peremptory Challenges, 22 PAC. L. J. 1305, 1327-28 (1991), which asserts that racial and 
gender classifications are analogous in three respects: first, both groups have historically 
suffered discriminatory treatment due to membership in an identifiable group; second, 
race and gender are both immutable characteristics, which cannot be changed; and third, 
minority members as well as females have traditionally been politically powerless. Based 
on these grounds, courts have conventionally treated race and gender classifications with 
special care. [d. at 1327. See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 
432 (1985) (holding that the requirements of a quasi-suspect class are historical discrimi-
nation, immutable traits, and political powerlessness). 
13
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1. The Government's Per~mptory Challenge 
A prosecutor's gender·based discriminatory peremptory 
challenge violates the Fifth Amendment's equal protection prin· 
ciples.87 As is the case with racially· based challenges, sexually 
discriminatory peremptory challenges are premised on the stere· 
otypical notion that a particular group of people are unfit to 
serve as jurors.88 While a venireperson may be successfully chal· 
lenged due to the prosecution's perception that the particular 
juror is unable to serve on the jury, gender·based challenges im-
ply that the group, as opposed to the individual, is unqualified. 
The Fifth Amendment forbids this type of group dis-
crimination.89 
2. The Defendant's Peremptory Challenge: The Question of 
State Action 
While Batson v. Kentucky held that the prosecution's exer-
cise of discriminatory peremptory challenges deprives a defend· 
ant of equal protection of the laws,90 the decision did not ad-
dress whether a criminal defendant's peremptory challenge is 
similarly limited by the Constitution. In De Gross, the Ninth 
Circuit addressed this question, and answered it in the affirma-
tive, drawing from and expanding upon recent United States Su-
preme Court decisions. 
The Ninth Circuit noted that equal protection principles 
are directed at state action,91 and that a criminal defendant's 
peremptory challenge is an exercise of state action.92 Thus, 
under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, the Fifth Amendment must 
87. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1439. 
88. [d.; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. 
89. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1439. 
90. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. 
91. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1440. See also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. 
Ct. 2077 (1991). 
92. Although the Ninth Circuit held that a criminal defendant's exercise of a pe-
remptory challenge is state action, the opposite conclusion has been reached by other 
tribunals. The Supreme Court of New York, in Holtzman v. Supreme Court, 526 
N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. 1988), held that because a criminal defendant's exercise of perempto-
ries is not compelled by the legislature or the courts, the state could not be held account-
able for the manner in which the defendant exercised his challenges. [d. at 898. However, 
this decision has since been overruled by People v. Kern, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990). 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/12
1993] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 123 
prohibit a criminal defendant's exercise of a discriminatory pe-
remptory challenge.93 
The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of the United 
States Supreme Court in the recent decision of Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete CO.94 In Edmonson, the Supreme Court ar-
ticulated the following three-prong test to determine whether a 
litigant's conduct constitutes state action: 1) the extent to which 
the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits; 2) 
whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental func-
tion; and 3) whether the injury caused is aggravated by the inci-
dents of government authority.9~ Applying these criteria to the 
facts of Edmonson, the Supreme Court held that a defendant in 
a civil action was a state actor.98 
In De Gross, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Edmonson 
Court's reasoning pertained equally to a situation involving a 
criminal defendant rather than a civil litigant.97 Applying the 
93. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1440. 
94. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, a black man, sued defend-
ant, Leesville Concrete Company, for negligence. [d. at 2079. Leesville Concrete Com-
pany exercised two of its three peremptory challenges to remove black venirepersons. [d. 
Citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), plaintiff Edmonson urged the court to 
require Leesville Concrete Co. to set forth a race-neutral justification for its challenge. 
The district court denied Edmonson's request, stating that Batson did not apply to civil 
cases. On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling. The Fifth Circuit 
held that defendants become state actors when they exercise peremptory challenges, and 
that limiting Batson to criminal cases "would betray Batson's fundamental principle 
[that) the state's use, toleration, and approval of peremptory challenges based on race 
violates the Equal Protection Clause." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 
1308, 13i4 (5th Cir. 1989). On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to 
trial. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990). The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals. 
95. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083. 
96. [d. at 2083-87. With respect to the first inquiry of the Edmonson test, the Court 
noted that a private party could not exercise its peremptory challenges without the 
overt, significant assistance of the court. The Supreme Court further stated that the 
assistance of the judge, in enforcing the discriminatory challenge, has not only made the 
court a party to the biased act, but has placed its power, property and prestige behind 
the discrimination. Addressing the second prong of the test, the Court held that a tradi-
tional function of government was evident. The Court explained that the peremptory 
challenge is used in selecting an "entity that is a quintessential governmental body, hav-
ing no attributes of a private actor." [d. 
Finally, the Court held that racial discrimination in the official forum of the court-
room raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted there, thus 
compounding the injury due to the incidents of government authority. 
97. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1440. 
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first of the criteria set forth in Edmonson to the facts of De 
Gross, the Ninth Circuit held that a criminal defendant wholly 
relies on governmental assistance and benefits when exercising 
peremptory challenges.98 The court declared: 
[w]ithout the overt, significant participation of 
the government, the . . . entire jury system, in-
cluding peremptories, could not exist or operate. 
The government sets up the panel selection pro-
cedures. Peremptory challenges are not self-exe-
cuting. A party seeking to exercise discriminatory 
peremptory challenges must necessarily rely upon 
the court to call citizens to serve as jurors, to be-
gin the voir dire in a judicial proceeding, and to 
excuse challenged venirepersons. We conclude, as 
the Supreme Court did, that a party could not ex-
ercise its peremptories without significant govern-
ment assistance. ee 
The second prong of the Edmonson test focuses on whether 
the peremptory challenge involves the performance of a tradi-
tional governmental function. The Ninth Circuit maintains that 
a criminal defendant's exercise of a peremptory challenge does 
involve a customary governmental function. loo The court ac-
knowledged that a jury is a governmental body whose purpose is 
to carry out governmental functions. lol Jury selection and voir 
dire proceedings are similarly exercises of governmental author-
ity: although the prosecution and defendant retain a degree of 
control over the process, the court maintains constant control 
and supervision. l02 Citing Edmonson,103 the court observed that 
"[t]he fact that the government delegates some portion of this 
power to private litigants does not change the governmental 
character of the power exercised. "104 
Finally, applying the third prong of the Edmonson test, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that since the discriminatory peremptory 
challenge was exercised in the public federal courthouse, the in-
98. [d. 
99. [d. 
100. [d. at 1441. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. 
103. 111 S. Ct. at 2086. 
104. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1441. 
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jury suffered by the challenged venireperson is aggravated. 1011 
The occurrence of the discriminatory incident within the con-
fines of a federal courthouse effectively intimates that the trial 
judge has "abdicat[ed] his duty not to discriminate."106 
The Ninth Circuit recognized no meaningful distinction be-
tween a criminal or a civil case, and held that a criminal defend-
ant exercising peremptory challenges is a state actor.107 Because 
the Fifth Amendment's equal protection principles regulate 
state action, the court reasoned that a criminal defendant's exer-
cise of discriminatory peremptory challenges must be prohibited 
since the defendant is acting under authority of the state. lOS 
D. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE EXE~CISED WITH DISCRIMINATORY 
INTENT -
1. The Prosecution's Challenge of Tellez 
De Gross established a prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination against the government for striking Tellez,109 using 
the test articulated in Batson v. Kentucky.1l0 The prosecution 
explained that it wanted to "achieve a m~re representative com-
munity of men and women on the jury."lll The district court 
accepted the government's justification as being based on neu-
tral grounds. ll2 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district 
court, stating that this explanation automatically established a 
prima facie case of gender discrimination.u3 Under Batson, the 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 1441-42. This conclusion is supported by the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). In that case, the Court 
held that a person acts under color of state law only when he is exercising power pos-
sessed solely by virtue of state authority. Id. at 317-18. Thus, the Court found that an 
attorney, although an officer of the court, is not a state actor for purposes of representing 
a client since that is essentially a private function. Id. at 319. 
108. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1442. 
109. Id. 
110. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
111. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1436. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1443. The court "sympathize[d] with the prosecutor's predicament in 
[that] case. Faced with a female defendant who was systematically excluding males from 
the jury, the prosecutor made an understandable effort tQ balance the gender composi-
tion of the jury. However ... we cannot find that thll prosecutor's admission constituted 
a neutral explanation." Id. at 1443 n.14. 
17
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prosecution's challenge of Tellez violates De Gross' Fifth 
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.ll4 Hence, the 
district court improperly struck Tellez from the jury.m 
2. De Gross' Challenge of Tiffany 
Under the Batson Court's analysis, the government simi-
larly established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination 
against De Gross.us The burden then shifted to De Gross to jus-
tify her challenge with a gender-neutral explanation.u7 Since De 
Gross failed to provide an explanation for her challenge, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the district court was correct in disal-
lowing her challenge and permitting Tiffany to serve on the 
jury.l16 
E. THE CONCURRING OPINION 
Judge Reinhardt concurred with the Ninth Circuit's ulti-
mate holding in De Gross that the conviction be reversed.1l9 The 
concurring opinion differs strongly, however, with the majority's 
conclusion that the criminal defendant is a state actor. 
The majority identified the defendant as a state actor be-
cause he or she invokes the authority of the state when exercis-
ing the governmental function of peremptory challenges.12o The 
concurrence contends that a criminal defendant, "the quintes-
sential adversar[y] of the state," cannot be characterized as a 
state actor.121 The concurrence proposes that the Edmonson test 
is inapplicable to a situation involving a criminal defendant, 
114. [d. at 1443. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-87, holding that the equal protection 
clause guarantees a defendant the right to be tried by a jury selected in a non-discrimi-
natory manner. The Batson Court also noted that intentional discrimination in jury se-
lection proceedings violates the defendant's right to' equal protection of the laws. [d. 
115. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1433. 
116. [d. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
117. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1442. 
118. [d. 
119. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992). 
The concurrence asserts that because De Gross' peremptory challenge to Tiffany did 
not involve state action, the district court should not have permitted the government to 
assert a Batson objection. Thus, the fact that Tiffany was empaneled despite De Gross' 
peremptory challenge is sufficient to require reversal of De Gross' conviction. [d. at 1447. 
120. [d. at 1440. 
121. [d. at 1443. 
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[it] cannot be disputed that a criminal defend-
ant's relationship to the state is fundamentally 
different from that of a private litigant in a civil 
case .... [I]n the ordinary context of civillitiga-
tion in which the government is not a party, an 
adversarial relationship does not exist between 
the government and a private litigant. By con-
trast, a criminal defendant has perhaps the most 
adversarial relationship possible with the state.122 
127 
The concurrence further asserts that a prosecutor adopts 
the mission of the state in attempting to convict the criminal 
defendant.123 Judge Reinhardt concludes that because the crimi-
nal defendant's sole objective is to thwart the prosecutor's ef-
forts at trial, this presents an impossible conflict, dispositive of 
the state action question. 124 
The concurrence states that since criminal defendants can-
not be characterized as state actors, their actions cannot violate 
the Constitution.121\ Therefore, the government is not entitled to 
assert a Batson objection to a discriminatory peremptory 
challenge. 126 
V. CRITIQUE 
United States v. De Gross raised the issue of whether a 
criminal defendant's exercise of a gender-based discriminatory 
peremptory challenge, as well as the prosecution's exercise of the 
same, violates the Constitution's equal protection principles.127 
The Ninth Circuit wisely extended the constitutional protection 
122. Id. at 1444-45. 
123. Id. at 1445. 
124. Id. at 1446. The concurrence likens the majority's reasoning to a stanza from a 
play by "those well-respected commentators on the absurdities found in our legal sys-
tem," Gilbert and Sullivan: 
Id. at 1447. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
A paradox, A paradox, 
·.A most ingenious paradox! 
How quaint the ways of paradox! 
At common sense she gaily mocks! 
127. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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afforded to racially discriminatory peremptory challenges by 
Swain and Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges as 
well. us Nevertheless, the court's conclusion that a prosecutor 
and a criminal defendant are equally restrained by the Constitu-
tion is troubling. 
A. CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE SUBJECT TO 
EQUAL PROTECTION RESTRAINTS 
It is well settled that the Constitution limits only state ac-
tion. 129 Thus, a criminal defendant will only be subject to equal 
protection restraints if he or she is considered a state actor. The 
eleven-member panel of the Ninth Circuit was sharply divided 
on the issue of whether or not De Gross' exercise of a peremp-
tory challenge as a criminal defendant constituted state 
action. ISO 
The concurring opinion reasoned that a criminal defendant 
cannot be deemed a state actor, since the defendant is wholly at 
odds with the governmental system. lSI Indeed, it does seem 
counterintuitive to suggest that a criminal defendant acts under 
the state's authority when exercising peremptory challenges, 
considering the state is contemporaneously using that same 
power to incarcerate or possibly even execute that defendant. 
The notions of equality and fairness inherent in due process and 
equal protection principles would seem to demand that a crimi-
nal defendant must be given every opportunity to utilize the pe-
remptory challenge system without being subject to the consti-
tutional restraints imposed on the state. IS2 
128. [d. at 1439. 
129. The United States Constitution, with the notable exception of the thirteenth 
amendment, limits only state action. The thirteenth amendment, ratified December 6, 
1865, provides that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
This individual amendment, passed to facilitate the reconstruction of the southern 
states, applies to private conduct as well as state action. 
130. The panel split 6-5. 
131. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1443. 
132. The logic of considering a criminal defendant a state actor can be summarized 
as follows: The state develops a formalized suspicion that the defendant is involved in 
criminal activity. The defendant is summoned into court where she will be given the 
opportunity to demonstrate her innocence. Although the defendant must be deemed in-
nocent until the state meets its burden of evidentiary proof, the defendant will be con-
sidered a state actor and limited by the Constitution's equal protection principles, effec-
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The concurrence additionally finds fault with the majority's 
application of the Edmonson analysis to the instant facts. 133 The 
majority stressed the significance of the peremptory challenge 
taking place in a governmental setting, noting that "the injury 
caused by discriminatory peremptories is exacerbated by the 
fact that the government allows it to occur in the courthouse-a 
traditional symbol of government authority."134 Judge Rein-
hardt, author of the concurrence, insists that this part of the 
court's analysis must be confined to civil proceedings because 
only in civil proceedings are the government's and private liti-
gants' interests harmonious with regard to voir dire.13II Con-
versely, it is clear that in criminal actions the prosecutor's and 
defendant's interests are in direct conflict at every stage, includ-
ing jury selection. Therefore, despite the fact that both civil and 
criminal proceedings take place within government buildings, it 
"cannot be disputed that a criminal defendant's relationship to 
the state is fundamentally different from that of a private liti-
gant."136 The majority seems to have ignored this inevitable con-
flict in finding state action. ls7 
tively undermining her ability to use whatever means to prevail at trial. 
133. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1443-44. See supra notes 95-108 for the Edmonson in-
quiries and their application to De Gross. 
134. [d. at 1441 (citing Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087). 
135. [d. at 1444. 
136. [d. at 1444-45. Judge Reinhardt further noted: 
[d. at 1445. 
It is hard to imagine a more palpable example of the exercise 
of state power than a criminal prosecution. But, that state 
power is wielded by the prosecutor against the criminal de-
fendant-not by the defendant on his own behalf. . . . Far 
from wielding state power, a criminal defendant attempts to 
thwart that power at every stage of the proceedings. 
137. In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1981), the Court found that a 
public defender could not be considered a state actor because their actions could not be 
"attributable to the government." A public defender's duty is to oppose'the state's mis-
sion in criminal trials: to enter "not guilty" pleas, move to suppress state's evidence, 
object to evidence at trial, cross-examine state's witnesses, and to altogether oppose the 
interests of the state. 
By this same rationale, a criminal defendant should not be characterized as a state 
actor. Certainly the defendant's position is even farther removed from the interests of 
the state than is the public defender's. The criminal defendant does not "assume an 
obligation to the mission of the state," and under no circumstances can he or she fairly 
be said to be acting on behalf of the state. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1446. In fact, Judge 
Reinhardt submits that the only distinction between a criminal defendant and his coun-
sel is that the public defender acts under a constitutional obligation rather than a sense 
of self-preservation. [d. at 1447 n.5. 
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Although logic seems to suggest that a criminal defendant 
cannot be characterized as a state actor, the majority of courts 
have held that because the court must actively enforce a crimi-
nal defendant's peremptory challenge, the defendant's actions 
do rise to the level of state action.138 Because a criminal defend-
ant faces possible incarceration at the hands of the state does 
not necessarily mean that he or she may not occupy the role of 
state actor for the limited purpose of exercising peremptory 
challenges. Support for this proposition can be found in the 
United States Supreme Court decision of Georgia v. 
McCollum. ls9 
In McCollum the Court addressed the question of whether 
equal protection principles prohibit a criminal defendant from 
engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges.140 The Court held that the Constitution 
does proscribe the exercise of racially-based discriminatory pe-
remptory challenges by criminal defendants as well as civil de-
fendants. Hl In so holding the Court provided a basis for recon-
ciling Edmonson iJ. Leesville Concrete with the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in De Gross, thereby abandoning the distinction be-
tween civil and criminal litigants in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges.142 
In its decision to apply the rationale of Edmonson to the 
facts of McCollum, the court confronted the issue of whether a 
138. See United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1433 (1992); Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). 
139. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). In McCollum, respondents were charged with assaulting 
two African-Americans. Id. at 2351. Before jury selection began, the prosecution moved 
to prohibit respondents from exercising racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. 
Id. The state theorized that the victim's race was a factor in the alleged beating. Id. 
Relying on Batson u. Kentucky, the state sought an order mandating that respondents 
provide a racially neutral justification for the peremptory challenges if the prosecution 
established a .prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 2351-52. 
The trial judge denied the motion, id., and the state supreme court affirmed, distin-
guishing Edmonson u. Leesuille Concrete because Edmonson involved private civil liti-
gants, not criminal defendants. State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688, 689 (1991). 
The United States Supreme Court overruled the state supreme court decision, hold-
ing that criminal defendants are subject to equal protection restraints as well as civil 
litigants. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2348. See infra notes 139-47 discussing the McCollum 
decision. 
140. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2348. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
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criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges consti-
tutes state action for the purposes of equal protection princi-
ples.143 Employing the three-prong test of Edmonson,144 the 
Court found that a criminal defendant was a state actor when 
exercising peremptory challenges.141i 
The McCollum Court provided a thoughtful insight on the 
issue which disturbed the concurring judges in De Gross: 
whether a criminal defendant, motivated by a private desire to 
protect his interest against the state, can be considered a state 
actor as well. 146 The Court noted: 
[T]he fact that a defendant exercises a peremp-
tory challenge to further his interest in acquittal 
does not conflict with a finding of state action. 
Whenever a private actor's conduct is deemed 
'fairly attributable' to the government, it is likely 
that private motives will have animated the ac-
tor's decision. Indeed, ... the private party's mo-
tive underlying the exercise of a peremptory chal-
lenge may be to protect a private interest.147 
This logic suggests that the "state" which the criminal de-
fendant is at odds with is distinguishable from the "state" from 
which he derives his authority when exercising peremptory chal-
lenges. As the majority in De Gross explained, if there were no 
distinction between the state as administrator of the justice sys-
tem and the prosecution acting as agent of the state, there would 
always be a potential conflict in criminal trials. H8 The court fur-
ther maintained that a criminal defendant's interests are dia-
metrically opposed to those of only the prosecutor, not to those 
of the government.H9 
The majority opinion in De Gross was consistent with the 
established case law. Accordingly, the court was justified in con-
cluding that De Gross invoked the authority of the state when 
exercising her peremptory challenges, and thus subjected herself 
143. [d. at 2359. 
144. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text. 
145. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358. 
146. [d. 
147. [d. 
148. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1441. 
149. [d. 
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to the restraints of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection 
principles. 
Once the state action issue is established, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision to restrict discriminatory practice in jury selec-
tion by both the defense as well as the prosecution is sound. 
B. GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATORY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
PROHIBITED BY EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES 
The De Gross court held that the Constitution prohibits in-
tentional discrimination on the basis of gender as well as race. 
The :Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Fifth Amendment's equal 
protection principles must restrain state actors from discrimi-
nating on the basis of gender because the same harm results as 
would if the discrimination were based on the venireperson's 
race.1llO 
While the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that equal protection 
principles will not abide gender-based discrimination is sound, 
the court was somewhat conclusory in analogizing sexual dis-
crimination to racial discrimination. Racial and gender classifi-
cations have historically been afforded disparate treatment.lIIl 
However, there are undeniable similarities between racial and 
gender classifications that would seem to warrant similar treat-
ment for purposes of the peremptory challenge: both groups 
have historically endured discrimination due to membership in 
an identifiable group; race and gender are immutable character-
istics which cannot be altered; and minority members and fe-
males have traditionally been politically powerless.11l2 
150. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text for discussion of gender-based 
discrimination and the resulting harm. 
151. Joe, supra note 86, at 1327. Historically, gender groups have been categorized 
as quasi-suspect classes, requiring an intermediate scrutiny standard of review. [d. See 
also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that 
gender classifications standard of review is satisfied only where an important governmen-
tal purpose is being furthered). 
Alternatively, racial classifications have traditionally been categorized as suspect 
classes demanding a strict level of scrutiny. See Russell w. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal 
Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121, 141-42 (1989) (maintaining that racial 
classifications violate equal protection principles unless they are necessary to further a 
compelling state interest). 
152. Joe, supra note 86, at 1327. C{. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 
U.S. 432 (1985); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/12
1993] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 133 
At an intuitive level the extensions of the Batson prohibi-
tion against racially discriminatory peremptory challenges to 
gender-based challenges seems logical. However, any simple 
analogy between gender and racial classifications is ineffective 
and conclusory.l&3 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit wisely ex-
tended equal protection to gender-based peremptory challenges. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
United States v. De Grossl1S4 establishes that a criminal de-
fendant's exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state ac-
tion for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection 
principles. Hence, the challenges cannot be exercised in a dis-
criminatory manner so as to offend the Constitution. While the 
logic of such a proposition may offend traditional notions of 
equality, the conclusion is probably sound as it is supported by 
the majority of precedent. 
Additionally, De Gross prudently extends the established 
equal protection rights afforded to racial discrimination to gen-
der-based peremptory challenges. De Gross represents an impor-
tant step forward in preserving the constitutional rights of po-
tential jurors, and should serve as a beacon for other circuit 
courts faced with a similar situation. 
Eric K. Ferraro· 
These cases held, respectively, that mentally retarded persons and elderly persons are 
not quasi-suspect classes because they do not satisfy the criterion of membership in an 
identifiable group, immutable characteristics, and political powerlessness, inter alia. 
153. See, e.g., Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of 
Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -
Isms), 1991 DUKE L. J. 397, 404, asserting that: 
[tlo analogize gender to race, one must assume that each is a 
distinct category . . . [however I, this division is not possible. 
Whenever it is attempted, the experience of women of color, 
who are at the intersection of these categories and cannot di-
vide themselves' to compare their own experiences, is rendered 
invisible. Analogizing sex discrimination to race discrimination 
makes it seem that all the women are white and all the men 
are African-American. 
154. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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